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The objetive of this work is to estimate the returns to overeducation and infraeducation 
for wage-earners in the hospitality sector in Andalusia. Using a cross-section of workers 
from a representative survey carried out with the financial support of ERDF (project 
IFD97-0858), we compare educational attainment of workers and job-required 
education (reported by workers and managers) in order to obtain a general 
especification of the earnings function from the allocation model of the labor market. 
This model contains the human capital specification and the job competition 
specification as special cases. The results show as an earnings especification that 
includes the possibility of mismatch between educational attainment and requirement is 
superior to one that only incorporates one or other of the two sides of the matching 
process. When we use the opinions of workers (managers) about educational 
requirements, the rate of return to years of adecuate education is 2.89% (3.32%). The 
penalty in the rate of return to education of every year of overeducated workers is 
estimated at  –1.45 ( -1.21) percentage points compared to workers with the same 
schooling years and matching the level required by the job. The penalty on the rate of 




Address for correspondence: 
Ricardo Pagán Rodríguez. 
Facultad de C.C. E.E. y Empresariales. 
Plaza del Ejido s/n. 29.071 Málaga. 
Teléfono: 952-131186. 
Fax: 952-132075. 
E-mail: rpr@uma.es.   1
1. Introduction 
 
The analysis of the relationship between the educational system and the labor 
market has led to different research areas, among which two stand out (Sicherman, 
1991). Some studies have focused on how the capacity of the educational system and 
employees to adapt to business requirements in the labor market is reflected in 
educational returns; others have analyzed the determinants of the match between the 
educational levels achieved by employees and those required by the job they hold. 
 
In this context, the current study falls into the first category and its aim is to 
estimate the rate of return of the years of study undertaken by those employees whose 
level of education is equal to that required by their job. Similarly, we calculate the rate 
of return of the years of under- or overeducation of those employees whose educational 
level does not correspond to that required by their job. In order to obtain the required 
education in the job, we use the opinions given by workers and managers. 
 
With this objective in mind, this study is organized into the following sections. 
First, we review the theoretical framework for the analysis of educational mismatch. 
Then, we present the different versions of the wage equation which leads to the 
specification required to estimate the rates of return to schooling when the qualifications 
held match those required for the job, and when this is not the case. In the next section 
we describe the database and variables used in the empirical analysis.  Finally, we 
present some points arising from the study and offer some conclusions. 
 
2. Theories of educational mismatch 
 
When we review the theoretical literature analyzing the mismatches between 
employees’ schooling levels and the level required by their jobs, we can identify three  
analytical perspectives (García Serrano and Malo, 1996): the theory of human capital, 
the job screening model, and the job competition theory.  A fourth analytical 
perspective, which includes the models mentioned above and which derives from the 
assignment theory, is developed in the works of Tinbergen (1956), Sattinger (1980), and 
Hartog (1981). 
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The human capital theory (Becker, 1964; Mincer, 1974) assumes that the 
educational mismatch is a transitory and short-term phenomenon.  The origin of this 
imbalance is due to the uncoordinated functioning of the mechanisms which shape the 
characteristics of labor supply and demand.  Thus, for example, if we assume that 
productive activities in the economy are carried out by using a flexible technology 
which employs three productive factors (capital, skilled labor, and unskilled labor), an 
increase in the supply of skilled labor where the demand for it remains constant will 
result in its price falling and, therefore, in a change in the relative prices of the 
productive factors. The model predicts the resulting effects on labor supply and demand. 
On the demand side, business will adapt to the new situation by substituting – so far as 
the technology permits – capital and unskilled labor for skilled labor, the latter element 
becoming relatively cheaper
i.  On the supply side, this change implies a fall in the 
profitability of the additional schooling years required to convert an unskilled worker 
into a skilled one.  
 
The neoclassical model of the functioning of the labor market, on which the theory 
of human capital is based, assumes that the information available to economic agents is 
perfect. This means that firms know the marginal productivity of each worker and that 
the competitive process results in wages being dependent on this productivity level. 
Specifically, this model recognizes the existence of a direct relationship between the 
workers’ educational level and their productivity and, therefore, their wage level. 
However, in general, the assumption of perfect information in the marketplace does not 
hold.  For instance, the information available to employers about their workers’ 
characteristics does not enable them to establish their productivity. In this context, the 
job screening model (Spence, 1973; Arrow, 1973) suggests that workers’ educational 
level acts as an indicator enabling employers to identify the most capable and, possibly, 
the most productive workers.  This is recognised by the workers themselves and 
therefore acts on those workers who wish to stand out against their competitors in the 
job market as an incentive to invest in their own education.  
 
The third theoretical perspective for analyzing educational mismatch is known as 
the job competition theory (Thurow, 1975).  Like the job screening model, Thurow’s 
approach suggests that the existence of educational mismatches in the marketplace is a 
permanent phenomenon. This can be explained theoretically by assuming that workers   3
compete for vacant jobs in the market according to their productive characteristics, 
which are related to their educational level and work experience, among other factors. 
In addition, both the educational level and experience are inversely related to the costs 
incurred by firms of training employees to be able to perform their jobs.  
 
Finally, the assignment theory – developed by Sattinger (1980) and Hartog (1981) 
on the basis of the initial contribution by Tinbergen (1956) – considers that the labor 
market is a market of individual productive characteristics, on the basis of which we can 
define the individual supply of labor and demand by firms. In line with these productive 
characteristics, this model assumes the existence of heterogeneous workers and 
heterogeneous jobs.  Wages, therefore, are the instruments which facilitate the 
assignment of workers to the available jobs, rather than simply rewards attributable to 
their different productivity levels. As a result, the market finds it difficult to engineer a 
complete match between workers’ productive characteristics and employers’ job 
requirements. Educational mismatches, therefore, can present a permanent problem in 
the labor market. This model represents, in this sense, a theoretical framework which 
includes the human capital and job competition models. 
 
3. The wage equation 
 
Following the theoretical framework outlined, the human capital theory model 
suggests wages depend on those aspects related to labor supply -- that is, on the salary 
workers' specific characteristics  -- and does not take into account requirements 
associated with the job they perform. Following Mincer (1974), the wage equation for 
this theoretical context can be specified as follows: 
 
LNG(W) = a0 + a1 X + a2 X
2 + a3 E
 + a4 Z
 + e’  (1) 
 
where (W) denotes the wages of the worker, (E) schooling years, (X) work experience, 
(Z) can denote, in a wider specification, another set of variables related to the specific 
characteristics of the worker, and (e’) is the error term. Under certain conditions, the 
coefficient value of the variable schooling years
ii, a3, is interpreted as the rate of return 
for an additional year of education (Mincer, 1974). 
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On the other hand, regarding the job competition theory, wages do not depend 
on the characteristics of the workers, but on the characteristics of the job itself. A simple 
specification of the equation for this model is as follows (Thurow and Lucas, 1972): 
 
LNG(W) = b0+ b1 E
r + e’’  (2) 
 
where (E
r) is the number of schooling years required to perform the job. 
 
Finally, according to the comprehensive framework of the assignment theory, 
the wage equation includes supply and demand factors  and can be specified as follows 
[Duncan and Hoffman (1981), Hartog and Oosterbeek (1988), and Sicherman (1991)]: 
 
LNG(W) = g0 + g1 E
r + g2 E
o + g3 E
u + e’’’  (3) 
 
where the number of schooling years of the worker (E) has been split into the years 
required by the job (E
r ), and the years of overeducation (E
o) and undereducation (E
u). 
In this way we have: 
E  = E
r + E
o - E





r  if  E > E
r 
E




  if E
r > E 
E
u = 0  otherwise 
 
The interpretation of the coefficients of the wage equation (3) is as follows (Sicherman, 
1991): 
 
g1 =  The returns to years of adequate education. 
g2 = The returns to years of education that exceed those required, relative to adequately 
educated workers with the same required education. 
g3 =  The loss of earnings due to one year of undereducation relative to adequately 
educated workers with the same required education. 
 
The expected signs for these coefficients are the following: g1 >0, g2 >0, g3 <0. In 
addition, in the context of labor mobility, the rate of return for the years of   5
overeducation is expected to be lower than the rate for the required schooling years g2 < 
g1. This prediction is based on the assumption that at the beginning of their working life, 
workers seek learning opportunities in the jobs they take, and so they are willing to 
obtain lower returns for their educational level providing they gain experience which 
will allow them to have access to better jobs in the future.  
 
  In addition, the estimation of the wage equation parameters (3) will also enable 
us to empirically compare two stylized facts (Hartog, 1997, Sloane et al 1999). 
Assuming that there are two types of job, a goob job requiring a formal education of S1 
and a poorer job requiring S2, where S1 > S2, the stylized facts are as follows: 
 
1)  The earnings of overeducated workers (Eoes1)  are less than the earnings of those 
with the same level of education as themselves, but who are in jobs with the 
required level of education (Eaes1), but more than the earnings of workers who have 
the required but lower level of education (Eaes2): 
 
Eaes1> Eoes1> Eaes2  
 
2)  The earnings of undereducated workers (Eues2)  are more than the earnings of those 
with the same level of  education who work in jobs which require that level of 
education (Eaes2), but less than the earnings of workers who have the required and 
higher level of education (Eaes1): 
 
Eaes1> Eues1> Eaes2  
 
Finally, once the specification of the wage equation is estimated (3), both 
hypotheses can be compared. First, we can contrast whether g1 = g2 = - g3 and thus, not 
reject equation (1) proposed by the human capital theory. Second, we can find out 
whether g2 = g3 = 0 and test empirically whether the wages only depend on factors 
exclusively related to supply, as expressed in equation (2) based on the job competition 
model. 
 
4. Data and variables used 
   6
The data available for this study came from a database created in 2000 as a part 
of the research project “Déficit de cualificaciones, productividad y salarios en el sector 
turístico andaluz” (Skill shortages, productivity, and wage in the Andalusian Hospitality 
Sector, Project code 1FD97-0858 financed by ERDF and CICYT). In order to measure 
the educational mismatch of salary workers, we used the responses given by employees 
(What kind of education does a person need in order to perform your job?) and 
employers ((What kind of education does a person need in order to perform the job in 
each of these occupations?). The comparison between required and attained education 
leads to three possible definitions: 
 
a)  “Adequately educated” are those workers whose required education coincides 
with the formal education possessed by them. 
b)  “Overeducated” are those workers whose education is greater than that required 
to perform the job. 
c)  “Undereducated” are those workers whose level of education is less than that 
required for the job. 
  
Bearing in mind the theoretical framework chosen and the data available, the 
empirical variables used in the estimations are the following. The dependent variable in 
the wage equation is the logarithm of the monthly net wages earned. Besides the 
logarithm  of the number of working hours per month, we include as explanatory 
variables some continuous variables related to the worker's human capital 
characteristics: years of schooling required for the job, theoretical experience in the 
market, and seniority in the current firm. Second, we include a set of demographic 
variables such as the gender and marital status of the employee. Third, we incorporate 
variables related to the labor status of the employee and the characteristics of the job 
such as the type of business (hotel or restaurant), the size of the firm, and the type of 
contract. Although the database also offered information regarding the workers' 
occupations
iii, the correlation noted by some authors between this variable and the 
educational level can downbias the true value of the effect of education over the 
dependent variable wages
iv. Thus, it was decided not to i nclude this variable in the 
equation. Finally, the empirical variables used to control the educational mismatch of 
workers are specified in two different ways. First, by defining as continuous variables 
the individual's years of overeducation (E
o) and undereducation (E
u), using the   7
responses given by workers and employers and taking equation (4) as the starting point. 
Second, by classifying the variables schooling years and schooling years required for 
the job (based on employers' and employees' responses) according to dummy variables 
that correspond to seven educational levels: No schooling, Compulsory Schooling; 
Vocational Education I, Upper Secondary School, Vocational Education II, Lower 
University Degree, and Higher University Degree.  
 
Table 1 shows the percentage of workers not presenting educational mismatch -- 
i.e. workers matching the educational level required for the job (Match) -- overeducated 
(Over) and undereducated (Under), classified according to the responses given by 
workers and employers regarding the educational requirements of the job
v.  
 
Table 1 Educational mismatch according to the responses of workers and employers 
regarding educational requirements of the job (by percentage based on educational 
level). 
 
SCHOOLING YEARS REQUIRED (r) 
Workers   Employers 
r < s  r = s  r > s  Nº  r < s  r = s  r > s  Nº 
SCHOOLING YEARS 
COMPLETED (s)  
Over-  Match  Under  Obs.  Over-  Match  Under  Obs. 
No schooling  (*)  44.1  55.9  111  (*)  0.9  99.1  113 
Compulsory Schooling  4.2  55.9  39.8  1230  1.6  29.3  69.1  1254 
Vocational Education I  18.0  44.7  37.2  266  34.1  21.5  44.4  270 
Upper Secondary School  18.1  46.7  35.3  465  33.9  15.0  51.1  472 
Vocational Education II  29.6  62.2  8.3  230  45.3  36.2  18.5  232 
Lower University Degree  28.4  64.2  7.3  313  39.9  55.9  4.2  313 
Higher University Degree  61.6  38.4  (*)  73  72.0  28.0  (*)  75 
TOTAL SAMPLE  14.4  53.8  31.9  2688  20.4  28.5  51.2  2729 
(*) These cases cannot occur due to the way the variable is constructed. 
 
According to employees' responses, 53.8% of the total sample consider that their 
education matches the requirements of their job, while according to the employers this 
is the case for only 28.5%. These figures reflect the expected results, since workers will 
tend to assert their suitability in order to avoid recognizing situations of 
undereducation
vi. This can be seen when comparing the number of individuals that are 
under- or overeducated according to both the employers' and employees' points of view. 
Employers assert that there are more cases of undereducation (51.2% of the total 
sample) than employees (31.9%). For overeducated individuals, workers consider that   8
only 14.4% of the total sample falls into this category, while employers think 20.4% do 
so. Similarly, the greatest number of individuals whose education matches t he job 




We now present the results for the estimation of the wage equations proposed 
according to the two alternative specifications of the variable schooling years: as a 
continuous variable and as a categorical variable. Table 2 shows the results obtained 
after e stimating wage equations (1), (2), and (3) according to the responses of 
employees and employers. 
 
According to equation (1), the rate of return to education  (E) is 2.4%.  This low 
rate of return can be explained due to the low educational attainment of salary workers 
in the hospitality sector in Andalusia (only a 4.1% of workers has university degree). 
When using equation (2), the rate of return for the required schooling years (E
r) 
obtained according to workers' responses (1.98%) and employers (1.92%) are 
statistically the same but lower than the rate of return obtained with equation (1).  
 
In equation (3), and according to workers' responses, the coefficients for the 
required years of schooling, overeducation, and undereducation are significant and have 
the expected sign. The rate of return for each year of education of employees having the 
required educational level for the job is 2.89%. However, the return to an additional  
year of education that exceeds the job requirement (overeducation) is estimated  at 
1.44%.  In this way, and according to Sicherman (1991), penalties in the rate of return to 
an additional year of schooling that exceeds the jod requirement, relative to workers 
with the same level of schooling who have the required schooling on the job, is 
estimated at –1.45 porcentage points (= 1.44 – 2.89). On the other hand, the penalty on 
the rate of return to education of every year of difference between the level of study 
required for the job and the level of education the undereducated worker has  is 
estimated at –1.66 porcentage points. Similarly, the wage differences between workers 
who work in jobs that required an additional year of schooling (a year more than they 
have) and workers who have the same level of schooling, but work in jobs that require 
that level of schooling, is 1.23 porcentage points (= 2.89 – 1.66).   9
Table 2: Results from the estimations of wage equations (1), (2), and (3) according to 
the responses of workers and employers for the variables under study. 
 
Variable  Coefficient  t-statistic 
Equation (1)     
 Schooling years of the individual (E)  0.0240  16.42 
 R
2 adjusted  0.6352 
Based on workers' responses: 
 
   
Equation (2)     
 Schooling years required for the job (E
r)  0.0198  16.30 
 R
2 adjusted   0.6334 
Equation (3)     
 Schooling years required for the job (E
r)   0.0289  18.59 
 Years of overeducation (E
o)  0.0144  5.39 
 Years of undereducation (E
u)  -0.0166  -8.15 
 R
2 adjusted  0.6446 
Sample   2.688 
Based on employers' responses:     
Equation (2)     
 Schooling years required for the job (E
r)  0.0192  13.35 
 R
2 adjusted   0.6237 
Equation (3)     
 Schooling years required for the job (E
r)   0.0332  18.64 
 Years of overeducation (E
o)  0.0211  7.60 
 Years of undereducation (E
u)  -0.0192  -10.70 
 R
2 adjusted   0.6457 
Sample  2.729 
Notes. The logarithm of monthly net wages is the dependent variable. All equations include the following 
variables: monthly working hours (as logarithms), gender, work experience, seniority in the current firm, marital 
status, type of firm (hotel or restaurant), type of contract, and size of the firm. The estimated coefficient for the 
logarithm of monthly working hours is not different from unity in the estimations presented. For the variables 
measuring work experience and seniority in the firm the results obtained are those expected. Married men get 
higher wages, but no differences were found in the type of firm the individual worked for (hotel or restaurant). 
Earnings also varied depending on the type of contract; the workers with a full-time (reference category) and 
permanent contract had higher wages. Regarding the size of the firm, the only significant differences with a 
positive sign are found in companies with more than 100 employees compared to the reference category (less 
than 9 workers). In order to test the result obtained for the coefficient of the variable "schooling years of the 
individual" we estimated the wage equation (1) using the database from the European Community Household 
Panel (Panel de Hogares de la Unión Europea PHOGUE) for 1996. The results obtained show a return to 
education for those people working in the hospitality sector  of 2.3%, i.e., a decimal lower than our estimation 
for wage equation (1). 
 
When dealing with employers' responses, the rate of return for the required 
education is 3.32%. This rate of return is higher and statistically different from the 
return obtained with employees' responses (2.89%) -- the value of the t-statistic for 
coefficient equality  was 2.43--. On the other hand, the rate of return to education for 
each year of overeducation was estimated at 2.11%, which is also higher and 
statistically different -- the value of the statistic for coefficient equality  was 2.44 -- to 
the one obtained with the employees' responses (1.44%). On the other hand, the penalty   10 
for undereducated individuals on the rate of return for each year of undereducation was 
estimated at –1.92 porcentage points, a figure which is not statistically different to the 
one obtained with employees' responses (1.66%)  -- the value of the t -statistic for 
coefficients equality was –1.46--. It is important to note that rates of return to education 
for Andalusian workers in the hospitality sector are significantly lower than those 
obtained in similar studies for the Spanish economy as a whole. For example, in a study 
for the whole of Spain, Alba (1993) reported rates of return of 5.8% for the required 
educational level; 4.7% for years of undereducation and 2.7% for years of 
overeducation.  
 
Finally, table 3 shows the results obtained while testing alternative hypotheses. 
The results show a rejection of the null hypothesis according to the value obtained by 
the F-statistic. Thus, evidence shows that a wage equation specification such as (3) -- 
where both supply and demand factors are included -- would be superior to one that 
only incorporates one or other of the two sides of the matching process.  
 
Table 3: Comparing human capital and job competition theories based on responses 
from workers and employers regarding the educational requirement of jobs. 
 
  F Statistic 
According to Workers: 
Human Capital Theory: g1 = g2 = - g3  44.79 (*)   
Job Competition Theory:  g2 = g3 = 0  43.17 (*)    
According to Employers: 
Human Capital Theory: g1 = g2 = - g3  41.02 (*)     
Job Competition Theory:  g2 = g3 = 0  85.21 (*)    
(*) Statistically Significant at 1%. 
 
Following the methodology proposed by Hartog (1986), the analysis carried out 
so far by the estimation of wage equation (3) can be substantially enhanced by creating 
dummy variables for each combination of the individual's educational level and the 
educational level required for the job. In this way, if the schooling years have been 
classified into seven levels, we can define a 7x7 matrix, where each of the 49 dummy 
variables will take value 1 if the individual belongs to a given cell, and zero otherwise. 
The final equation to be estimated is the following : 
  
LNG(W) = d0 + dij Qij
 + dz Z
 + m   (5) 
   11 
where i is the current educational level of the individual (i = 1,…,7), j is the required 
level for the job (j = 1,…,7), and Z a vector of control variables. 
 
Tables 4 and 5 show the results obtained from estimating equation (5) according 
to workers' and employers' responses, respectively. We only show the coefficients of the 
49 dummy variables created to model the different situation of educational match and 
mismatch. The reference category used in both tables is a worker who has no schooling 
and whose level matches the educational requirements of his/her job. Equation (5) has 
also been estimated by imposing a set of linear constraints on the equality between 
coefficients, both on rows and columns. The coefficients estimated under the equality 
constraint within a row or column appear in Tables 4 and 5 labeled as “constrained”. 
These Tables show an applied F-test to compare whether the null hypothesis holds and 
the label “F-test” is included. 
 
Each cell of the 7x7 matrix in Tables 4 and 5 show the value of the estimated 
coefficient and the t -statistic (in parenthesis). The main diagonal of the matrix 
represents those individuals whose education matches the requirements of the job they 
do. If this diagonal is taken as reference, the cells below represent overeducation. On 
the other hand, cells above the main diagonal represents situation of undereducation. 
With a sample of 2,688 cases (Table 4) and 2,729 (Table 5) and 49 cells (7x7), the mean 
number of cases per cell is 54.9 and 55.7, respectively. However, most cases are 
concentrated in the main diagonal or near it (below or above)
vii.  
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Table 4 Results from estimating the wage equation according to the schooling years of the individual and the schooling years required for the 
job (based on responses given by EMPLOYEES). 
  
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL REQUIRED FOR THE JOB  
EDUCATIONAL 
LEVEL COMPLETED 


















Constrained  F-test 














































































































































   














   
(*) = Statistically significant at 5%.  
Note: Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and the t statistic (in parenthesis).    13 
Table 5: Results from the estimation of the wage equation according to schooling years of the individual and schooling years required for the 
job  (based on responses given by EMPLOYERS). 
  
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL REQUIRED FOR THE JOB   
EDUCATIONAL 
LEVEL COMPLETED 
BY THE INDIVIDUAL  
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(*) = significant at 5%.  
Note: Each cell shows the estimated coefficient and the t-statistic (in parenthesis).    14
Again from the coefficients estimated for the cases of over- and undereducation it is 
possible to test the stylized facts. In order to compare and obtain a better understanding of 
these four relationships, we can take as reference, for example, the submatrix (3x3) obtained 
by considering three higher educational levels (i.e., upper secondary school, and lower- and 
higher university degrees). In Table 4 this submatrix is marked by a thicker border. 
Expression (6) for the first stylized fact corresponds to: 
 
a77 > a76 > a66          (6) 
0.629 > 0.524  > 0.429 
 
In other words, a worker with a higher university degree in a job requiring this 
educational level earns more than someone with the same degree working in a job requiring a 
lower university degree (i.e., the person presents overeducation). However, the latter would 
earn more than another worker with a lower university degree having a job matching his/her 
qualifications. On the other hand, expression (7) corresponding to second fact, would translate 
as follows: 
a66 > a56   > a55         (/) 
0.429 > 0.351 > 0.298 
 
Now a worker with a lower university degree in a job requiring such an educational 
level would earn more than someone working in the same job but having only completed 
higher secondary school (i.e., the person is undereducated). However, the latter would earn 
more than another worker with higher secondary school education having a job matching 
his/her qualifications. If this same analysis in done to the rest of the matrix cells, we can assert 
that the relationships used in expressions (6) and (7) are verified in most cells with significant 
coefficients. 
 
In order to analyze the level of statistical significance of the constraints, it is necessary 
to calculate the value of the F-statistic, which allows us to compare the coefficients estimated 
in the constrained and non-constrained model from a joint perspective. The results obtained 
and labeled as “F-test” show how in 11 of the 14 constrained models estimated the n ull 
hypothesis is rejected. 
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We now look into the results based on the employers' responses regarding the 
educational requirements of jobs (Table 5). In this case, all the coefficients in the main 
diagonal are significant, except the cell corresponding to compulsory schooling completed 
(a22). As in Table 4, all coefficients increase as we move towards higher educational levels. 
There are 16 statistically significant coefficients located below the main diagonal (i.e., 
overeducated), while there are 12 below the matrix's diagonal (i.e., undereducated). The two 
relationships detected in Table 4 (expressions 6 and 7) are also clearly verified in Table 5. If 
we now focus on the submatrix (3x3) obtained by only taking into consideration the three 
higher educational levels, then: 
 
             a77 > a76   > a66                     a66 > a56    > a55 
         0.869 > 0.786 > 0.691                    0.691 >  0.589> 0.515 
 
The hypothesis of equality of the sum of square residuals in the models with and 
without constraints is rejected when the F-statistic is applied in all cases except in row 1 and 3 
(no schooling and vocational education I) in the constrained model. The results, shown in 
Table 4 and 5, are coherent with reports from other authors such as Hartog (1986), Hartog and 
Oosterbeek (1988), and Sloane et al. (1999).  
 
Using these results it is possible to calculate the annual differential return for the 
different levels of education
viii. Table 6 only shows estimations of returns to education for 
workers matching the educational requirements of the job according to the responses of 
workers and employers. First of all, and focussing on the employees responses, the results 
show that those workers who have completed compulsory schooling have a differential return 
for each schooling year of 2.38% in relation to workers who have no schooling. The highest 
annual differential returns are found in the higher educational levels, i.e., lower university 
degree (9.45%) and higher university degree (16.99%). Besides this, it is important to point 
out that the coefficients estimated for vocational education I and upper secondary school are 
not statistically different. This result means that for workers whose education matches the job 
requirements there is no increase in differential returns to each schooling year if a worker 
decides to increase his/her educational level from vocational education i to upper secondary 
school.  
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Table 6 Calculation of annual differential returns to different educational levels for 





Estimated Coefficient  Annual differential 
returns  
According to workers' responses:       
        No Schooling   0     
Compulsory schooling  6.4  0.142  2.38% 
Vocational Education I  10  0.217*  2.49% 
Upper Secondary School  12  0.238*  - 
Vocational Education II  13  0.298  7.78% 
Lower University Degree  15  0.429  9.45% 
Higher University Degree  17  0.629  16.99% 
According to employers' responses:       
        No Schooling  0     
Compulsory schooling  6.4  0.377  7.15% 
Vocational Education I  10  0.483*  4.53% 
Upper Secondary School  12  0.505*  - 
Vocational Education II  13  0.515*  - 
Lower University Degree  15  0.691  16.13% 
Higher University Degree  17  0.870  19.52% 
    Note: The estimated coefficients are not statistically different at 1%. 
 
Second, by analyzing the annual differential returns to education according to 
employers' responses we can see greater returns for higher educational levels, i.e., lower 
university degrees (16.28%) and higher university degrees (19.62%). These results show 
higher returns when compared with those obtained with workers' responses. Besides this, the 
coefficients estimated for vocational education i, upper secondary school, and vocational 
education i are not statistically different. Consequently, whether upgrading from vocational 
education i to upper secondary school does not bring earnings rewards from the workers' 
perspective; having upper secondary school or vocational education ii are equivalent to 
vocational education i from the employers' view. It is worth noting the high annual 
differential return of workers with compulsory schooling completed in relation to those who 
have no schooling (7.15%), when compared to the results obtained from workers' responses 
(2.38%). 
 
The differences found in the calculation  of annual rates of return  -- carried out 
according to the educational requirements of a given job and bearing in mind both the 
workers' and employers' points of views  -- could be due to the higher educational 
requirements presented in employers' replies (i.e., resulting in a greater number of 
undereducated individuals) and the lack of acknowledgement on the part of workers of 
undereducation in certain circumstances (i.e., a greater number of individuals matching the    17
educational requirements of their jobs).  These two factors affect the value of estimated 





Using the database originally generated in the research project “Déficit de 
cualificaciones, productividad y salarios en el sector turístico andaluz” (1FD97-0858), and 
taking the model formulated by Mincer as the starting point, we have estimated different wage 
equations in order to measure the effects of individuals' educational mismatch on the returns 
to their investment in education. In this work, our results show that a wage equation 
speficification where both supply and demand factors are included is the best representation 
of the generation data process.  
 
According to workers' opinions, the estimated coefficients show a return to education 
for workers matching their job requirements of 2.89%. However, the educational returns for 
each additional year for overeducated workers is 1.44%. For undereducated workers, the 
penalty for each year below the educational level required for the job is equivalent to –1.66 
percentage points. Using the employers' opinions, the rate of return to education for the years 
required becomes 3.32%, while for every additional year of overeducation the return is 
2.11%; and for the undereducated workers, the penalty translates into –1.92 porcentage 
points.  
 
The calculation of the annual differential rate of return to education for workers who 
do not present an educational mismatch in relation to their jobs is greater for lower- and 
higher university degrees. The coefficients estimated for vocational education i, upper 
secondary school, and vocational education I are not statistically different. Consequently, 
whether upgrading from vocational education i to upper secondary school does not bring 
earnings rewards from the workers' perspective; having upper secondary school or vocational 
education ii are equivalent to vocational education I from the employers' view. From the same 
perspective, the yearly differential return of workers with compulsory schooling completed in 
relation to those who have no schooling (7.15%) is higher when compared to the results 
obtained from the workers' responses.    18
Finally, it is necessary to bear in mind two aspects in the analysis of rates of returns to 
education. First, it would be necessary to directly include the variable "productivity" in the 
analysis. Authors such as Tsang (1987) have pointed out the negative effect of overeducation 
on workers' productivity by using an index of work satisfaction. Second, we have to note that 
the main limitations of this work are related to the constraints imposed by the data available, 
the impossibility to control using Heckman´s method by estimating a probit of participation -- 
since we do not have data on people who do not work-- or the use of instrumental variables to 
take into account the correlation between the variables "schooling years required for the job" 
and "undereducation years" with the error term included in the wage equation. Nevertheless, 
the work of Raymond et al. (2001, p. 260) points out that there are very few differences 
between the estimations obtained by ordinary least squares and those estimated using the 
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i It could be argued that the elasticity of the substitution between skilled and unskilled labor is higher than that 
between skilled labor and capital (which could reasonably be regarded as complementary factors). In this case, 
therefore, the shift in demand essentially affects unskilled labor. 
ii The other terms used in this work for this variable are years of education and educational level.  
iii The different occupational categories were obtained from the "The Spanish National Labor Agreement for the 
Hospitality Sector”. The resulting list of occupations can be found in Sánchez Ollero (2001). That work also 
includes the features of the database used as well as the sampling method employed for its construction. 
iv See, for example, the work of Oliver et al. (1998) for the Spanish economy. 
v The level “Compulsory schooling” was assigned with a mean value of 6.4 years. This value results from 
calculating the weighted mean of schooling years for each group of workers, the weighting structure being the 
distribution of workers according to the educational level achieved. 
vi Hartog and Jonker (1997) pointed out that individuals tend to overestimate the educational requirements 
associated with a given job or simply match these requirements to their own level. 
vii In Tables 4 and 5 there are 13 cells where the number of cases is greater than zero and lower than 10; most of 
them are concentrated in columns 1 (no schooling) and 7 (Higher University Degree), and row 7 (Higher 
University Degree). For example, the coefficient estimated for cell a 47 in Table 5 (having an educational level 
equivalent to Upper Secondary School but a job requiring Higher University Degree) is only based on four cases. 
viii See, for example, Lassibille and Navarro (1998), and Lassibille (1993). 